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Wed, June 19, 2013
In 2 009 , the H1 N1 pandem ic strain of influenza serv ed as
a dram atic wake-up call for biosurv eillance experts
around the world. Despite m ajor adv ances in dom estic
and global surv eillance capabilities, H1 N1 was spreading
rapidly across the United States long before a v accine
could be dev eloped, tested, and m ass-produced in tim e to
slow the pandem ic. Today , the threats posed by the H7 N9
influenza v irus and the MERS (Middle East Respiratory
Sy ndrom e) Coronav irus are a significant concern to
global health officials. Although it is far from clear how
these two v iruses are transm itted, it seem s likely that anim al-to-hum an spread
could be play ing a role in the ev olution of one or both of the v iruses.
That supposition should not be a surprise to any one who knows the sheer
num ber of zoonotic threats on a com prehensiv e list of the newly em erging (or
re-em erging) infectious diseases. Giv en what was observ ed with the rapid
introduction of H1 N1 to hum ans and the subsequent unchecked spread of the
disease, a closer and m ore detailed understanding of the existing strengths and
weaknesses of global and dom estic surv eillance sy stem s m ay be the key to
im peding the spread of these and other em erging zoonotic threats – rabies, for
exam ple, is a disease that can easily be transm itted from anim als to hum ans.
Animal Surveillance Systems in the United States
Within the United States, surv eillance program s for infectious diseases are
spread across a div erse array of federal, state, and local agencies. Departm ents
of health usually focus their greatest attention on hum an diseases;
departm ents of agriculture giv e prim ary attention, though, to anim als
com m only classified as liv estock; and departm ents of natural resources or
wildlife are responsible for the tracking and surv eillance of non-dom esticated
and wild anim als.
These understandably different priorities lead to som e significant intrinsic
breaks in continuity . In June 2 01 0, the U.S. Gov ernm ent Accountability Office
published an analy sis of the federal gov ernm ent’s own biosurv eillance sy stem s
and found that the div erse array of program s assigned to v arious departm ents
suffered from a sev ere lack of ov erarching leadership and com plicated national
strategic planning. As a follow-up, the White House published a National
Strategy for Biosurv eillance in July 2 01 2 and, a few m onths later (Nov em ber
2 01 2 ), a National Biosurv eillance Integration Center Strategic Plan for the
U.S. Departm ent of Hom eland Security (DHS). The im plem entation of these
new strategies is ongoing, so progress in the field of integrated biosurv eillance
will likely be an area of increasing scrutiny ov er the com ing y ears.
Ev en within the anim al surv eillance sy stem itself, a div erse array of data
sources m ust be m ore closely aligned to prov ide an accurate nationwide
understanding of zoonotic diseases. The National Anim al Health Surv eillance
Sy stem (NAHSS) serv es as an integrated fram ework for the federal and state as
well as univ ersity and industry -based entities to collect, collate, and rev iew
anim al health data throughout the United States.

Most people
understand the
need for a strong
national-defense
program capable
of defeating any
likely adversary.
Very few, though,
recognize and/or
are prepared to
counter the
potentially
devastating effects
of a global
pandemic.
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The ov erarching goal of the NAHSS is m ulti-pronged. First, the program seeks
to serv e as an early detection and global surv eillance sy stem for both foreign
anim al and newly em erging diseases. Second, the NAHSS serv es as a data
collection sy stem for existing “program diseases” and, in that respect, will help
researchers understand the current status, the potential im pact of v arious
interv entions, and/or changes in the dy nam ics of such diseases. Finally ,
NAHSS helps to m onitor anim al sy stem s for diseases of high im pact on both
production and the nation’s food m arkets.
Here it should be pointed out that the NAHSS has m ade significant progress in
recent y ears and, am ong other things, has standardized the data collection
processes used by all 50 states. Howev er, work continues on the dev elopm ent of
a U.S. National List of Reportable Anim al Diseases, where the goal is to m ake
the National List of Reportable Anim al Diseases aligned with the international
efforts of the World Organization for Anim al Health (OIE).
The Influence of Pandemic Influenza on Domestic Surveillance
The growing threat posed by a pandem ic influenza, particularly Highly
Pathogenic Av ian Influenza (HPAI), has driv en the enhanced dom estic
surv eillance of non-hum an anim als. The Veterinary Serv ices unit of the U.S.
Departm ent of Agriculture’s (USDA) Anim al and Plant Health Inspection
Serv ice aim s to partner with a broad spectrum of state and industry
organizations to m onitor and test the nation’s dom estic poultry and swine
populations to ensure that foreign influenza strains are constantly observ ed.
This enhanced surv eillance effort has been significant, according to the USDA,
which reports that m ore than a com bined 4 7 8,000 tests were conducted
during the fourth quarter of 2 01 2 and first quarter of 2 01 3 .
The USDA also is working activ ely to prev ent the establishm ent of dom estic
reserv oirs of HPAI. To begin with, the United States does not allow the
im portation of liv e birds, eggs, or hatchlings from countries where av ian
influenzas, such as the nov el H7 N9 strain, are prev alent. Products based on
those ty pes of poultry m ay be im ported only if they are treated in a m anner
that would hav e destroy ed the v irus. Pet birds also are routinely tested before
im portation. The USDA’s work in this area, com bined with heightened border
and port security , has been v ery effectiv e in prev enting the introduction of any
HPAI strains of particular concern.
Unfortunately , as the 2 009 -2 01 0 H1 N1 pandem ic seem s to indicate, there is
still room for im prov em ent in the U.S. dom estic surv eillance of influenza,
particularly in the swine population. Pigs are often an im portant interm ediary
between av ian influenza and hum an-adapted strains. The H1 N1 pandem ic
highlighted this risk. In the case of the 2 009 -2 01 0 pandem ic strain of H1 N1 ,
the ancestors of the v irus had been tracked in pigs for sev eral y ears, but a series
of non-anticipated ev olutionary changes led to the new strain. Prev enting new
outbreaks is a particularly difficult challenge in an env ironm ent in which
thousands of nov el av ian and swine influenza sequences are identified ev ery
y ear.
The constant struggle is not sim ply to identify new strains of a particular
disease in anim als, but to determ ine which of the new strains poses an
abnorm ally high risk to hum ans and/or other anim als. This is an area where
considerable work will be needed to reach a point of m ore effectiv e interv ention,
if ev er such a state could be achiev ed. Nonetheless, the effort m ust be m ade. In
May 2 009 , for exam ple, in its response to the 2 009 H1 N1 pandem ic, the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prev ention called for “m ore sy stem atic
surv eillance of influenza v iruses in pigs.”
International Systems of Surveillance: A Complex Network
Many diseases that threaten U.S. liv estock originate ov erseas, particularly in
nations where population densities, agricultural practices, and surv eillance
m echanism s differ significantly from U.S. dom estic standards. Like m ost other
international security m easures, the m ethodical surv eillance of diseases of any
ty pe is subject to local capabilities – and v ulnerable to them as well, if the
capabilities are lim ited. Largely for that reason, standards v ary between
locations, leav ing participants in the international food trade sy stem
susceptible to exposure. Recognizing this problem , international agencies hav e
dev eloped rigorous surv eillance and response guidelines to detect and at least
am eliorate these international food safety v ulnerabilities.
Perhaps of greater im portance are the international com m unity ’s cooperativ e
efforts between and am ong different agencies. In April 2 01 0, in recognition of
the growing threat posed by foodborne diseases, OIE, the Food and Agriculture
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Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, and the World Health Organization
(WHO) dev eloped a collaborativ e strategy spelling out their different, but
com plem entary , m issions in disease control and prev ention. That strategy
div ides responsibilities along the v arious agencies’ areas of expertise and, where
responsibilities ov erlap, encourages the free exchange of inform ation.
One product of the FAO/OIE/WHO tripartite agreem ent, the Global Early
Warning Sy stem (GLEWS), jointly consolidates epidem iological data for use by
other international agencies, national authorities, nongov ernm ental
organizations, and the global public. The extensiv e GLEWS database of disease
ev ents tracks the incidences of anim al disease, including zoonoses, across the
world, m aintaining a lev el of situational awareness on all fronts. With som e 7 0
HPAI incidents m onitored by the FAO from July 2 009 to January 2 01 2 , it is
obv ious that GLEWS already has im prov ed the interagency m obilization
needed to v erify instances of v arious diseases. Although pandem ics hav e
certainly threatened both anim al and hum an populations in the past, the FAO
also noted that HPAI was the first pandem ic to arriv e with adv ance warning –
thanks largely to the dev elopm ent and use of im prov ed surv eillance m ethods.
Responding to calls for international em ergency responses, in addition to
surv eillance efforts, the OIE-FAO’s Crisis Managem ent Center-Anim al Health
(CMC-AH) was established to prov ide additional help to local agencies in the
form of technical assistance. The CMC-AH, housed in the FAO’s Rom e
headquarters, uses adv anced surv eillance technology to facilitate international
responses to HPAI and other disease threats. Resource m obilization is needed in
som e cases, but the CMC-AH acts prim arily in an adv isory role to local
authorities. The international response to HPAI is nearly unprecedented in its
scope. Most of the CMC-AH’s activ ation calls to com bat the spread of HPAI
during the 2 006 -2 008 tim e fram e were issued because the organization was
m onitoring the disease around the clock in 1 3 endem ic countries.
The cooperation between and am ong the FAO, OIE, and WHO has prov ided
significant m ulti-sectorial protection against foodborne diseases. By m erging
their operational tools, professional expertise, and m aterial resources (when
applicable), these international organizations hav e prev ented effort
redundancies and m ultiplied the effectiv eness of their surv eillance and
interv ention actions.
As the threat of HPAI loom s, the U.S. public health experts inv olv ed would be
well adv ised to seek new m ethods to im prov e and expand national foodborne
disease surv eillance and interv ention capabilities. The U.S. Departm ent of
Health and Hum an Serv ices, the USDA, and other federal departm ents also
should continue to foster additional collaboration not only am ong their own
agencies but also with international partners. The consolidation of parallel
efforts to detect, research, and treat foodborne diseases lends itself to greatly
increased national food security actions.
Lessons to Be Learned: Improving Domestic Surveillance
One of the m ore im portant lessons to be learned from recent threats to global
health is the ov erarching truth that zoonoses now constitute a m ajor threat to
all nations throughout the world. Although recognition of that fact certainly
exists in the U.S. anim al-surv eillance com m unity and am ong public health
officials, m any segm ents of the hum an public health infrastructure are alm ost
wholly div orced from their anim al surv eillance counterparts in other agencies.
Moreov er, m any do not participate in the joint inform ation-sharing processes
necessary to inform their global partners about the broad spectrum of new
potential threats loom ing just ov er the horizon.
One m odel that m ay serv e public health well is the dev elopm ent of fusion
center-like collaborations with anim al surv eillance counterparts. Fusion
centers allow for interdisciplinary inform ation sharing and situational
awareness, principally in the law enforcem ent and hom eland security sectors,
but it was their efforts to obliterate certain silos that produced im prov ed
understanding am ong critical partners.
In sum m ary , the global anim al surv eillance com m unity has m ov ed into the
collaboration business principally due to the necessity produced by div ergent
national surv eillance program s. Dom estic surv eillance sy stem s would be well
serv ed to further im prov e that sam e m ulti-agency integration. Hopefully ,
recent efforts at the federal lev el to consolidate surv eillance efforts and prov ide
m ore centralized leadership will ev entually lead to adoption of sev eral
additional changes in collaboration that are still needed.
________________________
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healthcare capacity on remote islands. His work in the field led him to develop
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While earning his Bachelor’s degree, he worked in the Emergency Medical Services
in Rhode I sland as an emergency medical technician. He earned his Master of
Public Health degree from Boston University in I nternational Health, specializing in
Complex Humanitarian Emergency Management. He also coordinates the CHHS
internship program with the University of Maryland School of Medicine
Department of Epidemiology and Public Health.
Earl Stoddard (pictured) is the Public Health Program Manager for the University
of Maryland Center for Health and Homeland Security (CHHS). I n that post, his
responsibilities include overseeing many of the Center’s public health efforts,
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